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We assess the performance of National Regulatory Authorities across 16 EU countries 
regarding economic regulation in telecommunications sector, by constructing a so-called 
Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator for regulatory aspects such as effectiveness 
of the national regulatory system, effectiveness of the dispute settlement body, general 
market access conditions and application of remedies in markets for narrowband voice, 
mobile, broadband and business services. This composite indicator is the output measure 
used in the DEA non-parametric approach. The computation of efficiency scores allows to 
rank the NRAs and to detect some room for improvement in terms of efficiency gains for 
each national authority.  
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1 – Introduction 
 
The regulation of infrastructure industries, such as electricity, gas, water supply and 
telecommunications, was affected by significant changes over the past decades, with an 
increase in attractiveness of the so-called incentive regulation methods.
1 In the European 
Union (EU) these sectors have been liberalised and most of the traditionally publicly owned 
incumbent monopolies have been privatised. Consequently, National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) have been created in order to ensure a successful evolution towards 
competitive markets, regulate and supervise the relations between incumbents and new 
comers, who initially dependent on incumbents’ services. Mainly, it has been argued that 
policy-makers need to increase the credibility of regulatory commitments in order to 
encourage new investors to enter in the market (Levy and Spiller, 1996; Majone, 2001). 
Accordingly, both theoretical and empirical works have emphasised that the governments’ 
commitment of not interfering with property rights is crucial for attracting long term 
investments and developing sustainable growth levels (Henisz, 2002).  
 
Moreover, according to the New European Regulatory Framework, one of the main tasks 
required from the NRAs is to promote efficient investment and innovation in the field. 
Regarding these features, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) have, recently, underlined how 
countries with restricted public ownership in the sector and few barriers to entry have 
experienced improving productivity, as compared with countries in which regulation limits 
competition and public firms are prevalent. 
 
In this paper we assess the performance of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) across 
16 European Union countries. We take into account the effective economic regulation in 
the telecommunications sector, by constructing a so-called Composite Regulatory 
Performance Indicator (CRPI) for leading regulatory aspects such as effectiveness of the 
national regulatory system, effectiveness of the dispute settlement body, general market 
                                                           
1 For a review see Newbery (2000). 
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access conditions and application of remedies in markets for narrowband voice, mobile, 
broadband and business services. Using such composite indicator as an output measure, we 
then use a non-parametric approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to estimate 
efficiency scores for the NRAs in 2004. We are able then to distinguish NRAs that might 
qualify as “performing well” from those where some improvement might be possible. To 
our information, this is a first effort of checking efficiency and effectiveness in European 
NRAs using non-parametric analysis.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we give a brief overview of the European 
Union telecommunications sector, notably by providing stylised facts and motivation for 
the study. Section three presents the analytical framework. In section four we compute the 
composite regulatory performance indicators and perform the DEA calculations. Section 
five provides conclusions. 
 
2 – The EU telecomunications sector 
2.1 – Some stylised facts  
 
Between 1997 and 2002 the European Commission submitted eleven reports on the 
implementation of the package of directives liberalising and harmonising the European 
markets for telecommunications services. Following a review, the Commission proposed in 
2000 five directives to replace the twenty-five or so instruments then in force, together with 
a decision on the use of spectrum for communications services. Four of the directives 
subsequently adopted by the European Parliament and Council were required to be 
transposed into national law by 24 July 2003. They are the Framework, Access and 
Interconnection, Authorisation and Universal Service and Users’ Rights Directives
2. In 
parallel with this process the Commission adopted a directive on the basis of Article 86 of 
the Treaty (Competition Directive), consolidating previous directives liberalising the 
provision of services on these markets. 
                                                           
2 The remaining directive, known as the e-Privacy or Data Protection Directive, was due for transposition by 
31 October 2003. We report in detail the Directives’ contents in Appendix Table A1. 
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This course of actions has naturally influenced the telecommunications sector in Europe. 
According to European Commission (2006) and OECD (2005), e-communications markets 
are now characterised by an increasingly positive outlook. In 2003 the size of the 
telecommunication services market in the OECD increased to around USD 950, notably 
due to wireless communications and the Internet. On the one hand, revenues from mobile 
services reached USD 336 billion. On the other hand, the impact of the Internet has 
generated a new revenue stream through subscriptions but has also amplified the demand 
for fixed network access, backbone capacity and leased lines. 
 
Competition is increasing in most markets, bringing higher benefits in terms of price, 
quality and innovative services to consumers. Across the OECD, although the process of 
liberalisation has been faster in the wireless sectors, there were in 2004 no countries with a 
monopoly for the provision of fixed network services (see Table 1).  
 
The sector is emerging from a period of cost cutting and debt reduction. For the EU 
countries, overall revenue growth in the sector has been estimated between 3.8 per cent and 
4.7 per cent for 2005, while the fixed data and mobile services have shown strong growth 
of 8.3 per cent and 5.9 per cent respectively. This is mainly due to the fact that traditional 
fixed line carriers are losing market share in favour of mobile operators that are offering 
rising quantities of airtime in return for a flat monthly fee as well as advanced value added 
services. On average the mobile penetration rate is now at 92.8 per cent for the EU 25 and 
the rate for the EU 15 has increased by 4 percentage points to 91 per cent. 
   6
Table1 – Competition in fixed network and in mobile infrastructure, 
number of OECD countries 
 
  Competition in fixed network  Competition in mobile infrastructure 
 Monopoly  Duopoly 
Open 
competition Monopoly Duopoly 
Three 
operators 
Four or more 
operators 
1989  27  1 2  24  6 0  0 
1990  27  1 2  23  7 0  0 
1991  25  1 4  23  7 0  0 
1992 24  1  5  18  11  1  0 
1993 23  1  6  15  12  3  0 
1994 22  1  7  11  14  4  1 
1995 22  1  7  11  13  4  2 
1996 21  1  8  6  16  5  3 
1997  19  0 11  3 18 4  5 
1998  8  0 22  0 14 8  8 
1999  7  0 23  0  9 13  8 
2000  6  0 24  0  5 15 10 
2001  3  0 27  0  4 14 12 
2002  2  0 28  0  4 10 16 
2003  1  0 29  0  4 12 14 
2004  0  0 30  0  4 13 13 
Source: OECD (2005). 
 
Interconnection is one of the basic building blocks for a competitive market. In the fixed 
sector the downward trend in interconnection tariffs has continued (see Figure 1), above all 
in the United Kingdom, for local level termination. Alongside, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy and Sweden have performed significant cuts. Conversely, Malta and Slovakia have 
seen slight reductions and need more efforts to reach average EU levels. Finally, Latvia has 
introduced very significant cuts, bringing the rates for single and double transit to below the 
EU average. 
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Source: EC (2006) 
 
In the mobile sector, on the other hand, the average fixed-to-mobile termination rate for 
Significant Market Power (SMP) operators in the EU15 decreased by 14 per cent between 
July 2003 and July 2004.  The divergence in charges between the SMP and non-SMP 
operators (see Figure 2) was mainly due to regulatory intervention by NRAs to orientate 
charges to cost for SMP operators, although even for non-SMP operators, interventions set 
by the NRAs have sometimes occurred
3. Many Member States have implemented 
significant cuts, notably the United Kingdom, a reduction of more than 50 per cent, as well 
as Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, these charges are still eight times 







                                                           
3 For istance as a result of on the basis of a competition enquiry or setting a price ceiling to avoid excessive 
tariffs. 
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Figure 2 – EU15 average fixed-to-mobile interconnecion charges for SMP and non-SMP 



































SMP operators  Non SMP operators
 
Source: EC (2006) 
 
Overall, the conditions for competition seem to be well established in most OECD 
countries, and analogously, in the EU. The financial crisis, endured by the industry, has led 
to a number of mergers and bankruptcies among telecommunications operators. As a result, 
while the number of fixed Public Switched Telecommunication Network (PSTN) operators 
licensed in some countries has diminished, the number of new entrant operators has 
increased across most countries.
4 However, despite the increase in the number of operators 
in the fixed telecommunications market, and that facilities-based competition is supported 
within OECD countries, competitive markets are developing slowly. 
 
Regarding the EU Member States, to the best of our knowledge, so far all of them have 
concluded the adoption of primary legislation and notified the Commission thereof.
 As far 
as timely transposition is concerned, the Commission has launched legal proceedings 
against those States who were most behind in the process. As a result, proceedings are 
pending before the European Court of Justice against Belgium, France, Greece and 
                                                           
4 3G (IMT-2000) operators, for instance, are expected to rapidly increase over the time. One important 
development in OECD mobile markets is the growing number of mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
in the market.
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Luxembourg.
5 Secondary legislation (substantive, in some cases) still needs to be 
implemented in five Member States in order for the primary legislation to be effective: 
Belgium, Estonia, France, Latvia and Poland.  
  
2.2 – Regulatory framework and study motivation 
 
Over the last decade, following Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996), scholars’ attention has been 
focused on the effects of alternative institutional environments on the performance of 
capital intensive regulated industries such as telecommunications. Specifically, Levy and 
Spiller have argued that a country’s institutional endowment determines “the nature of 
regulatory problems”.
6 In particular, subjective administrative discretion has a negative 
impact on the confidence of investors regarding the safeguard of their assets and, hence, on 
the performance of regulated industries.
7  
 
Moreover, empirical studies have shown that increasing investment and economies 
conditions are positively influenced by a good monitoring system across institutions 
(Henisz, 2000, 2002, and Henisz and Zelner, 2001). As a consequence, independent bodies 
have been created with the scope of ensuring a successful evolution towards competitive 
markets, regulating and watching over the relations between incumbents and new comers, 
who initially dependent on incumbents’ services.  
 
According to the WTO (1996), an independent regulator is defined as a regulator that is 
“separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services”. 
But this seems to be just a limited version of a wider meaning of independence of 
                                                           
5 Belgium and Luxembourg both notified their transpositions measures in June 2005, while France notified 
their final secondary measures in September 2005. 
6 They give a wide definition of institutional endowment, moving from the study of the performance of 
regulated telecommunications industries in different political and social environments, but for a complete 
review on the importance of political institutions for economic performance see also North (1990), Thatcher 
(1999), Koelbe (1995) and Hall and Taylor (1996). 
7 The authors underline the existence of a strong and independent judiciary; unified governments (as in 
parliamentary systems) or divided (as in many presidential systems); a turnover in government; and the 
quality of the regulatory bureaucracy. 
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telecommunications regulatory institutions. Already in 1993, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has labeled independence as “a term that variously refers 
to the separation of regulatory and operational functions, neutrality, insulation from 
external pressure, or simply the designation of an official publicly identified as having the 
regulatory responsibility and not subservient to the rest of the ministry”. Overall, there are 
three leading features of the independence of regulators: i) independence from the operators 
of the telecommunications sector; ii) independence from other interested parties such as 
industrial interests and iii) independence from political actors like ministers for the day-to-
day matters (Smith, 1997).  
 
Surveying countries’ regulatory preferences in the telecommunications sector over the past 
years, it is possible to observe a variety of independent regulatory settings, whose two ends 
are the ministries and the National Regulatory Authorities . Within this continuum have 
occured several variations of regulatory institutions (Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000; OECD, 
2006)
8. Undoubtly, it has taken place, in this field, an international trend towards 
organising regulatory authorities separate from the relevant ministry jurisdiction. In certain 
istances there were significant functional changes in responsibilities. As a result, the last 
available data reveal the presence of 132 such independent regulatory authorities 
worldwide, compared to 14 in 1990 (ITU, 2005).  
 
Predictably, the valuable institutional settings for effective regulation, such as clearness of 
roles and aims of the regulator; independence of the regulator; participation in the 
regulatory process by interested parties; transparency of regulatory decisions; and 
accountability of the regulator for its decisions, have been also addressed from a theoretical 
perspective. For instance, Edwards and Waverman (2004) offer a systematic review of the 
topic. 
 
                                                           
8 The OECD differentiates between independent regulator defined as “a sector specific independent regulator 
that is separate from the ministry as well as telecommunications operators, and a telecommunications 
regulator, which could either be the independent regulator or the ministry where there is no independent 
regulator” (OECD, 2000: 7).   11
Nevertheless, as addressed by part of the juridical literature on the NRAs (Napolitano, 
2005), we still assist at a dichotomic analysis of the performance provided by these entities. 
On the one hand, the juridical discipline discusses administrative performance, on the other 
hand the economic discipline addresses economic performance. Consequently, each of 
them develops autonomous indicators, without much effort to reconcile both outputs. 
Therefore, economic empirical evaluations are mainly based on incentive aspects; vice 
versa legal considerations are isolated to governance issues, without giving an overall view 
of the regulatory activity. In fact, the previous distinction can be reconducted to the 
regulatory governance and the regulatory incentive classification introduced by Levy and 
Spiller (1994, 1996) and later developed by other authors (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; La 
Spina and Majone, 2000; Oglietti and Pontarollo, 2003).  
 
The main conclusion of such studies was the mutual acknowledgment that the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis has failed in assessing the regulatory effectiveness (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; La 
Spina and Majone, 2000). Particularly, three main limits of this approach have been 
outlined: a) there is an objective difficulty in identifying the real costs and benefits of 
regulatory activities; b) it is also possible that operators could adopt an opportunistic 
behaviour, hiding or manipulating the information, required for the assessing process; c) the 
complexity of the analysis could require the creation of ad hoc bureaucratic structure, that 
would imply a duplication of the regulatory costs, affecting consequently the assessing 
process itself (La Spina and Majone, 2000; Oglietti and Pontarollo, 2003).  
 
For assessing the NRAs activity correctly, Baldwin and Cave (1999) have argued that one 
needs to identify clearly what is under the regulator control and what is not. The result is 
that we could take also into account in our evaluation analysis five benchmarks: the respect 
for legislative mandate, the accountability, the due process, the expertise and the efficiency. 
Accordingly, through these parameters it would be possible to be aware of NRAs’ attitude. 
The determination of the legislative mandate, as it has been stated in the establishing law, 
help us in categorizing in which kind of regulatory governance, NRAs operate. As a result, 
we should be aware of the trade-off the Authorities have to face between the discretion and   12
the rules they are asked to follow. This is equivalent to address what are their competencies 
and conversely, their responsibilities within the regulatory decision-making process. It is 
quite intuitive that the higher the level of transparency adopted by the authorities, the lower 
the degree of discretion, and consequently the lower the degree of uncertainty for the 
private operators, who are so more spurred in investing in the sector.  
 
Unsurprisingly, few studies have focused on the empirical assessment of NRAs. This lack 
of attention was partially due to the fact that in most EU Member States, those authorities 
have been established recently and, thus, qualitative and quantitative data on those 
institutions are still poor. Such analysis focus on how capturing regulatory independence, 
using simple dummy variables to identify if the regulatory agency is or not directly under 
the control of the ministry (Edwards and Waverman, 2004).
9  
 
Gilardi (2005) has argued that Independent Regulatory Authority (IRAs) can be evaluated 
by looking at i) their impact on performance on the markets they regulate and capacity to 
strike a balance between possibly conflicting goals, ii) their capacity to produce high 
quality regulation and iii) the extent to which they respect the accountability standards. 
According to the author, the first and second aims can be measured through an econometric 
analysis assessing the link between IRAs and a range of indicators of market performance 
(defined widely to include the interests of both firms and consumers) and regulatory 
quality, while the third needs an assessment on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Our study innovates on prior empirical works on regulatory governance since we examine 
the NRAs considering the features discussed above, and assessing efficiency and 
effectiveness in NRAs using a non-parametric analysis.  
 
 
                                                           
9 For a detailed overview of this literature see Stern and Cubbin (2003), Gual and Trillas (2004) and Edwards 
and Waverman (2004). Regarding Italy, Abate and CIò (2000) investigated the energy sector, while Oglietti 
and Pontarollo (2000) studied the Italian Regulatory Authority for Telecomunication.   13
3 – Analytical framework 
 
We use Data Envelopment Analysis in order to compute input and output technical 
efficiency measures. The purpose of an input-oriented study is to evaluate by how much 
input quantity can be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities. 
Alternatively, by computing output-oriented measures, one could also try to assess how 
much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input 
quantities used. Since the computation of efficiency scores in the DEA framework uses 
linear programming, which is not subject to statistical problems such as simultaneous 
equation bias and specification errors, both output and input-oriented models will identify 




Using a simple example, assume that three different hypothetical NRAs display the 
following values for the output indicator and the input level, as reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Values for NRAs A, B and C 
  Output indicator  Input level 
NRA A  65  800 
NRA B  68  1150 
NRA C  75  1000 
 
The input level is the lowest in the case of the NRA A, which also reports the lowest output 
level. For instance, NRA C attains the highest output level even though it does not use the 
highest input level. NRA B may be considered inefficient, since it performs worse than the 
NRA C. In other words, the NRA B is dominated by the NRA C.  
 
The use of DEA allows the determination of a theoretical production possibility frontier 
and the computation of efficiency scores for each NRA. We compute those efficiency 
                                                           
10 Data Envelopment Analysis, originated from Farrell (1957) seminal work and was popularised by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Coelli et al. (2002), and Thanassoulis (2001) offer good introductions to the DEA 
methodology. 
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scores in such a way that they will be below unity if the DMU is inefficient and have the 
value one if the DMU is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
4 – Efficiency analysis  
 
We assess in this section the performance of National Regulatory Authorities across 16 EU 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. As inputs we use both the number NRAs’ employees and their revenues, scaled 
in per capita terms for each country. Particularly, we use the data provided by each NRA in 
its Annual Report for the year 2004. Regarding the output measure we first construct a 
composite indicator that tries to take into account the effective economic regulation in the 
telecommunications sector. The next subsection discusses and explains the construction of 
such composite output measure, while subsection 4.2 reports and analysis the DEA results. 
 
4.1 – Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator (CRPI) 
 
In this subsection we construct our measure of performance for NRAs in providing 
effective economic regulation in the telecommunications sector, by computing the so-called 
Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator (CRPI).  
 
For computing the CRPI we use two different databases: one is reported in the 
SCORECARD Annual Report, published by the European Competitive 
Telecommunications Association (ECTA), the other is the European Union Regulatory 
Institutions (EURI) Database developed by the Regulation Initiative Research Group at the 
London Business School. This allows us to trace some considerations on the existing 
methodology already implied in assessing the NRAs performance. Such composite 
indicators, CRPIsc and CRPIeuri, can be used as an output in the non-parametric approach 
DEA, in order to compute efficiency scores for NRAs in 2005.  
   15
The composite indicator based on the ECTA data is a simple average of a set of sub-
indicators of regulatory performance, grouped in four main leading regulatory aspects: the 
effectiveness of the national regulatory system; the effectiveness of the dispute settlement 
body; general market access conditions; and application of remedies in markets for 
narrowband voice, mobile, broadband and business service.  
 
According to the ECTA description, the chosen areas intend to reproduce the main 
principles expressed in the WTO Reference Paper on Telecommunications (1996), to which 
the European Union has adhered to and that strengthens the regulatory regimes.  
 
In particular, the first two areas of assessment deal with the regulator and the dispute 
settlement body, in terms of their modus operandi and effectiveness, considering the speed 
of process, fairness and enforcement power. Specifically, as effectiveness of regulation is 
generally meant the degree to which Member States and regulators have implemented and 
applied the new regulatory framework. 
 
Consequently, effectiveness of the regulator in relation to the exercise of its general powers 
is, essentially, a function of its: (i) speed of process, (ii) transparency of activities, (iii) 
powers and effectiveness of sanctions, (iv) scale of resources; (v) effectiveness of the 
appeal procedure; (vi) degree of independence; and (vii) speed and accuracy of the market 
analysis procedure. 
 
Following the WTO Reference Paper cited above, the ECTA survey treats separately the 
role of the dispute settlement body and the new NRAs’ functions, which result from the 
new regulatory framework. NRAs are, in fact, now required to undertake a forceful market 
analyses, in accordance with the European Commission's guidelines. Additionally, their 
public accountability in their decision-making process is increasing as in the case of public 
consultation process. As a result, the assessment of the efficiency of the dispute settlement 
body is based on criteria similar to those used to evaluate NRAs’ general powers, together   16
with their: (i) speed in exercising their powers, (ii) respect for due process rules, (iii) 
effectiveness of sanctions and (iv) effectiveness of appeal procedure.   
 
The third area touches how access rules and regulations are applied, i.e. the general market 
access conditions. To facilitate all competitors in providing services and giving more 
choices and assortment to end-users, regulators need to have broad policies to allow the 
provision of access in those markets, where some operators have Significant Market Power 
(SMP).
11 To estimate the application of such access rules, ECTA has considered the typical 
access remedies illustrated in the new regulatory framework: (i) access obligations; (ii) non 
discrimination and margin squeeze; (iii) price control; (iv) cost accounting separation; (v) 
rights of way; and (vi) numbering. 
 
The fourth area outlines the application of regulations and the degree of competition in key 
markets. This is measured through assessing the accessibility of wholesale products, which 
are widely recognised as playing an important role in ensuring competitive markets, and the 
measurement of market outcomes such as market shares, take-up of products, and end-user 
prices. The services covered include: (i) narrow band voice services, (ii) mobile services, 
(iii) access services relevant to business customers, and (iv) broadband services.   
 
Figure 3 shows the composition of the overall CRPI measure, illustrating how we derive 
these performance indicators, based on the 21 sub-indicators of regulatory effectiveness and 
access to markets and products.  
 
 
                                                           
11 Quite often, new operators do not have direct physical connections to end-users. Therefore, they depend 
substantially on their ability to benefit from rights of way enabling them to build or share physical 
infrastructure (since duplication of existing access networks is not economically feasible), and to have access 
to suitable numbering ranges.     17
Figure 3 – Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator Scorecard (CPRIsc) 
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In order to facilitate the compilation, we normalised the values and set the average for all 
indices equal to unity (following an approach inspired on Afonso et al., 2005). The values 
for each NRA are then recalculated relative to the average. We compile the performance 
indicator from the various indices giving equal weight to each of them. This weighing up of 
the variables is quite straightforward and economically intuitive (even though it is still 
somewhat ad hoc), and it avoids the problem of lack of economic justification.  
 









  (I1) 
Effectiveness of 
the dispute 












Austria  1.21 0.93 1.18 1.27 1.15 
Belgium  0.68 1.16 0.94 0.97 0.94 
Czech Republic  0.85  0.81 0.64 0.81 0.78 
Denmark  1.13 1.34 1.35 1.51 1.33 
France  1.17 1.22 0.87 1.23 1.12 
Germany  0.64 1.05 1.02 0.56 0.82 
Greece 0.86  0.90  0.59 0.84 0.80 
Hungary  1.09 0.94 0.68 0.93 0.91 
Ireland  1.07 0.93 1.39 1.01 1.10 
Italy  1.01 0.79 1.12 0.83 0.94 
Netherlands 0.87 1.05 1.27 0.82 1.00 
Poland  0.90 0.71 0.62 0.78 0.75 
Portugal  1.17 1.20 0.88 1.07 1.08 
Spain  0.92 0.99 0.81 0.83 0.89 
Sweden  1.13 0.70 0.98 0.87 0.92 
UK  1.29 1.31 1.75 1.44 1.45 
Mean  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum  1.29 1.34 1.75 1.51 1.45 
Minimum  0.64 0.70 0.59 0.56 0.75 
 
Overall, the best performers seem to be United Kingdom, Denmark, and Austria, while 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Greece are placed at lower end. Indeed, the UK scores the 
                                                           
12 The data and the respective sources are provided in the Annex.   19
maximum index level for two of the four sub-indicators (effectiveness of the national 
regulatory system, and general market access conditions), while Denmark scores the 
maximum on the other two sub-indicators (effectiveness of the dispute settlement body, and 
access to products).  
 
Regarding the Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator EURI, CPRIeuri, this is based 
on the simple average of two sub-indicators that measure respectively regulatory 
independence (EURI-I) and regulatory quality (EURI-Q).  
 
Specifically, the EURI Independence (EURI-I) index is a simple sum of 12 formal 
institutional elements in the regulation of telecommunications in the EU, which are directly 
correlated to the independence of the NRA from the government. Since it was attributed 
equal weight to each element, the index can therefore range from 0 to 12.  
 
In detail (see Edwards and Waverman, 2004), the EURI components take into account: 1) 
whether the NRA is single or multi-sector (multi-sector); 2) whether the NRA is single or 
multi-member (multi-member); 3) whether the NRA is funded by government 
appropriations or industry fees and consumer levies (funding); 4) whether the NRA reports 
only to the executive government or also to the legislature (reporting); 5) whether the NRA 
has adequate powers regarding interconnection issues (interconnect powers); 6) whether the 
NRA shares its regulatory functions with the executive (shared roles); 7) whether the 
legislature is involved in NRA member appointments (legislative appointment); 8) whether 
NRA member terms of appointment are fixed (fixed terms); 9) whether NRA member 
terms are renewable (renewable terms); 10) and 11) whether NRA resources are adequate 
(staff and budget); and 12) whether the NRA has been in operation for at least two years 
(experience). Each element is measured as either a categorical or dummy variable on a zero 
to one scale.  
   20
The EURI Regulatory Quality (EURI-Q) index instead, is the sum of 5 elements identifying 
on overall regulatory quality (aside from independence): clarity of roles (s), NRA powers 
index (zero to one), enforcement powers (s), effective appeals(s) and effective licensing (s). 
 
Table 4 shows the composition of the overall CRPI measure and Table 5 reports the 
normalised data for the two sub-indicators for 2003. 
 
Table 4 – Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator EURI (CPRIeuri) 
Regulatory Independence (EURI-I)  Regulatory Quality (EURI-Q) 
1. NRA Characteristics  1. Clarity of regulatory roles (s) 
- Multi-sector   
- Multi-member  2. NRA Powers 
- Funding  - Licensing 
- Reporting  - Tariffs 
- Interconnect power(s)  - Interconnection (s) 
- Shared roles   
  3. Effective Enforcement Powers 
2. NRA Member Appointments and Terms of 
Office   
- Legislative appointment  4. Effective Appeals Process 
- Fixed terms   
- Renewable terms  5. Effective Licensing 
  
3. NRA Resources   
- Staff   
- Budget   
  
4. NRA Experience   
 
 
According to Edwards and Waverman (2004), EURI index is positively correlated with 
other but similarly intentioned, measures of regulatory independence in the EU member 
states. In particular, in their analysis, these authors outline the correlation with Gual and 
Trillas’ (2003) measure of regulatory independence, and with subjective assessments of the 
degree of independence of the regulator from government, as reported in the European 
Commission Reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Framework (1998 – 2003). Finally, they found that the EURI indicator is also positively   21




Albeit this last result was the reason that has driven also our choice to use the two 
indicators, we see that the correlation between the CRPIsc and the CRPIeuri is not that high 
(only 22 per cent).  
 










Austria 0.69  0.93  0.81 
Belgium 0.62  0.93  0.77 
Denmark 0.79  1.55  1.17 
France 0.89  0.72  0.81 
Germany 1.10  0.83  0.96 
Greece 1.03  0.93  0.98 
Ireland 1.17  1.24  1.20 
Italy 1.41  0.21  0.81 
Netherlands 1.07  1.24  1.15 
Portugal 1.31  1.24  1.27 
Spain 0.93  0.52  0.72 
Sweden 1.20  1.24  1.22 
UK 0.79  1.44  1.12 
Mean 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Maximum 1.41  1.55  1.27 
Minimum 0.62  0.21  0.72 
 
As shown in Table 5, overall the best performers seem to be Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and 
Denmark, while Spain, Belgium, Italy and France are placed at lower end. Italy scores the 
maximum index level for EURI-I (Regulatory Independence), while Denmark scores the 
maximum for EURI-Q (Regulatory Quality). It seems that in this case the analysis is able to 
catch mostly the regulatory governance aspects, but not the NRAs’ impact on the markets 
they regulate. In this last feature the ECTA Scorecard seems to be broader and more 
                                                           
13 Excluding from the ECTA measure the information on government ownership of the PTO, as they do not 
consider this to be a component of regulatory independence.   22
adequate for our investigation, although not exhaustive. Nevertheless, we will also use the 
EURI indicator in the DEA computations for completeness sake. Therefore, the derived 
CRPI indicators will be used ahead in the next sub-section as to base our output measures 
for the DEA analysis. 
 
4.2 – Efficiency results 
 
Performance in itself, as measured in the previous section, may be achieved with a different 
combination of resources, which is precisely what we will now try to assess when looking 
at efficiency. 
 
Since the number of DMUs is not very large, one has to be careful in not using too many 
inputs or outputs, which would then increase the number of efficient by default DMUs.
14 
For our DEA analysis, we use two input measures: a financial measure, X1, which is the 
overall amount of revenues for each NRA, and a quantitative measure, X2, the number of 
employees for every NRA defined as follows (data and sources are reported in the Annex): 
 
X1 – financial resources of the NRA in per capita terms vis-à-vis the population of the 
country, euros in PPP; 
X2 – the number of NRA employees per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
The general relationship for the theoretical production possibility frontier that we expect to 
test, regarding efficiency in regulation, can be given by the following function for NRA i: 
 
  ) 2 , 1 ( i i i X X f Y = , i=1,…,n   (1) 
 
where Yi is the CRPI, and X1i and X2i are the previously defined two inputs for each NRA. 
 
                                                           
14 With less than three DMUs per input and output there is the risk that too many DMUs will turn out to be 
efficient.   23
In order to go around the eventual difficulties posed to the DEA approach when there are a 
significant number of inputs and/or outputs, we used principal component analysis (PCA) 
to aggregate some of the sub-indicators and reduce the dimensionality of multivariate data. 
 
The idea of the PCA is to describe the variation of a multivariate data set through linear 
combinations of the original variables (see, for instance, Everitt and Dunn, 1991). 
Generally, we are interested in seeing if the first few components portray most of the 
variation of the original data set, for instance, 80 per cent, without much loss of 
information. In a nutshell, the principal components are uncorrelated linear combinations of 
the original variables, which are then ranked by their variances in descending order. This 
provides a more parsimonious representation of the data set and avoids, for instance, that in 
the DEA computations too many DMUs are labelled efficient by default.  
 
Usually one applies the PCA by imposing that the original variables are normalized to have 
zero mean, this means that the computed principal components scores also have zero mean, 
and therefore some of the results from the PCA can be negative. Since, DEA inputs and 
outputs need to be strictly positive, the PCA results will be increased by the most negative 
value, plus one, in order to ensure strictly positive data (see, for instance, Adler and 
Golany, 2001). 
 
Regarding the output information based on the CRPIsc data, we first use the more 
disaggregated information of the four sub-indicators via a principal component analysis. 
The results of such analysis (see Table 6) that led us to use the first two principal 
components as the two output measures, which explain around 85 per cent of the volatility 
of the four sub-indicators in the CRPIsc (first four columns in Table 3). Moreover, this also 
implies that we only take into account the components whose associated eigenvalues are 
above 0.7, a rule suggested by Jollife (1972).  
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Table 6 – Principal component analysis for the 4 sub-indicators of CRPIsc 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R-Squared 
1  2.6035909            0.6508977     
2  0.7775812           0.8452930     
3  0.5142657            0.9738594     
4  0.1045623             1.0000000     
 
Additionally, we report in Table 7 the abovementioned principal components, to be used in 
the subsequent section in the DEA computations. 
 
Table 7 – Principal components of the CRPIsc sub-indicators, used in the DEA 
 P1  P2 
Austria 2.975  4.128 
Belgium 1.854  1.060 
Czech Republic  1.124  3.199 
Denmark 3.917  2.243 
France 3.000  3.087 
Germany 1.131  1.000 
Greece 1.258  2.944 
Hungary 1.883  3.763 
Ireland 2.589  3.236 
Italy 1.795  3.635 
Netherlands 2.083  1.928 
Poland 1.000  3.779 
Portugal 2.748  3.077 
Spain 1.658  2.704 
Sweden 1.790  4.555 
United Kingdom  4.406  2.706 
 
Note: The original principal components data were increased by the most negative value plus one, in 
order to ensure strictly positive data. 
 
In Table 8 we report the DEA analysis results obtained with the two inputs, X1 and X2, and 
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Table 8 – DEA results for NRAs, 2004, 
2 inputs (financial resources, employees) and 2 outputs (first two principal components of 
the four sub-indicators in CRPIsc) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Country 




Austria  1.000 1 1.000 1  Austria/  Austria  0.240 
Belgium  0.117 13 0.421 15  France,  Poland/  UK  0.073 
Czech Republic  0.108  14  0.796 11  Italy,  France/  Sweden, Hungary  0.108 
Denmark 0.212  11  0.889  8  France,  UK/  UK  0.072 
France  1.000 1 1.000 1  France/  France  1.000 
Germany  0.367  9  0.331  16  France/ France, Austria, UK  0.138 
Greece  0.203 12 0.757 13 
Poland, France/ Sweden, Hungary, 
Italy  0.191 
Hungary  1.000 1 1.000 1  Hungary/  Hungary  0.430 
Ireland  0.091  15  0.820  9  Poland, Italy, France/ UK, Austria  0.084 
Italy  1.000 1 1.000 1  Italy/  Italy  1.000 
Netherlands  0.272 10 0.618 14  France,  Poland/  France,  Austria,  UK  0.189 
Poland  1.000 1 1.000 1  Poland/Poland  1.000 
Portugal  0.062 16 0.820 10  France,  Poland/  Austria,  UK  0.062 
Spain 0.703  8  0.778  12 
Poland, France/ France, Austria, 
Poland, Italy  0.609 
Sweden  1.000 1 1.000 1  Sweden/  Sweden  0.119 
United  Kingdom  1.000 1 1.000 1  UK/ UK  0.294 
Average  0.571    0.827     0.350 
 
  Notes: CRS TE - constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
             VRS TE - variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
According to the results from Table 8, the theoretical production possibility frontier has 
seven countries: Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
This means that more than half of the DMUs would be seen as performing in an efficient 
way. However, given the relatively small number of DMUs in our sample, one could 
reduce the number of inputs or outputs in order to avoid that too many DMUs are labelled 
efficient, since some of them are simply efficient by default. Indeed, one can notice that this 
is precisely the case of Austria, Hungary, and Sweden. 
 
Therefore, one can use as an alternatively the overall CRPIsc measure as a single output 
(the last column in Table 3), and the results of such approach are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 9 – DEA results for NRAs, 2004, 
2 inputs (financial resources, employees) and 1 output (CRPIsc) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Country 




Austria  0.275 8 0.865 5  France,  UK/  France,  UK  0.209 
Belgium  0.117 12 0.615 13  France,  Poland/  UK  0.098 
Czech Republic  0.104  13  0.530 16  France  /  UK  0.072 
Denmark 0.208  10  0.891  4  France,  UK/  UK  0.063 
France  1.000 1 1.000 1  France/  France  1.000 
Germany  0.367  6  0.599  14  France/ France, UK  0.267 
Greece  0.203 11 0.552 15  France,  Poland/ France, UK  0.148 
Hungary  0.354  7  0.739  11  France/ France, UK  0.287 
Ireland  0.081  15  0.776  8  France, Poland/ France, UK  0.080 
Italy  0.853 4 0.817 6  France/  UK  0.710 
Netherlands  0.272 9 0.743 9  France,  Poland/  France,  UK  0.243 
Poland  1.000 1 1.000 1  Poland/  Poland  1.000 
Portugal  0.062 16 0.743 10  France,  Poland/  UK  0.060 
Spain  0.703 5 0.781 7  France,  Poland/  France,  UK  0.563 
Sweden  0.083 14 0.688 12  France,  Poland/  France,  UK  0.071 
United  Kingdom  1.000 1 1.000 1  UK/  UK  0.258 
Average  0.418    0.772     0.320 
 
  Notes: CRS TE - constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
             VRS TE - variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
From the results in Table 9 it is possible to see that three countries are now on the 
theoretical production possibility frontier: France, Poland and the United Kingdom. 
Morevoer, the three countries that previously were efficient by default (Austria, Hungary, 
and Sweden) are no longer on the frontier. 
 
In Table 10 we report the DEA analysis results obtained with the two inputs, X1 and X2, 
and the abovementioned overall CRPIeuri measure as a single output. In this case, where 
the sample is smaller, the theoretical production possibility frontier has just three countries: 
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Table 10 – DEA results for NRAs, 2004, 
2 inputs (revenues, employees) and 1 output (CRPIeuri) 
 
Input oriented  Output oriented  Country 




Austria  0.213 12 0.695 12  France/  Netherlands,  Portugal  0.213 
Belgium  0.118 13 0.646 13  France/ Portugal, Netherlands  0.113 
Denmark 0.298  11  0.919  9  Netherlands, Portugal / Portugal  0.079 
France  1.000 1 1.000 1  France/ France  1.000 
Germany  0.830 6 0.944 8 
Netherlands, France/ Netherlands, 
France 0.438 
Greece  0.491 10 0.843 10 
Netherlands, France/ Portugal, 
Netherlands 0.255 
Ireland  0.745 7 0.976 5 
Portugal, Netherlands / Netherlands, 
Portugal  0.122 
Italy  0.853 5 0.974 6  France/ Netherlands, France  0.853 
Netherlands  1.000 1 1.000 1  Netherlands/ Netherlands  0.389 
Portugal  1.000 1 1.000 1  Portugal/ Portugal  0.098 
Spain 0.720  8  0.841  11  France/ Netherlands, France  0.643 
Sweden  0.959 4 0.996 4 
Portugal, Netherlands / Netherlands, 
Portugal 0.134 
United Kingdom  0.704  9 
0.961 
7 
Netherlands, France/ Netherlands, 
Portugal   0.277 
Average  0.687   0.907     0.355 
 
  Notes: CRS TE - constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 
             VRS TE - variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
As in the case of the computation of the CRPI, we can observe results that are quite distant 
from the ones obtained using the CRPIsc. It seems to be significant the case of Portugal that 
previously was ranked in the lowest positions, and now it is one of the best performer. 
Conversely, France seems to confirm its position on the frontier. On the other hand, the UK 
is now ranked in a lower position.  
 
5 – Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have evaluated the performance of National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) across 16 EU countries regarding the effective economic regulation in 
telecommunications sector. For that purpose we construct a so-called Composite 
Regulatory Performance Indicator (CRPI), which is our output measure, against the inputs 
used: the number of NRAs’ employees and their revenues, scaled in per capita terms for   28
each country. With data for 2004, we constructed the performance index as a composite 
index of four sub-indicators of NRAs’ performance in leading regulatory aspects such as: 
effectiveness of the national regulatory system, effectiveness of the dispute settlement 
body, general market access conditions and application of remedies in markets for 
narrowband voice, mobile, broadband and business services.  
 
We computed input and output efficiency scores by solving a standard DEA problem with 
the NRAs as DMUs. The results indicate that inefficiencies may be significant, and some 
improvements may be possible across countries in order for them to move closer to the 
theoretical production possibility frontier. On average, and using one output and two input 
analysis, NRAs could have increased their output by 22.8 percent using the same resources, 
with a NRA like the Greek one having a theoretical margin for potential output 
improvement of 44.8 percent. On the other hand, on average, NRAs could have decreased 
their inputs by 58.2 percent and still obtain the same output. Nevertheless, the fact that 
some NRAs are not located on the theoretical production possibility frontier, and not 
labelled efficient, does not mean that they could actually be on the frontier. For instance, 
regulators may simply favour the faster implementation of a different set of regulatory 
interventions.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at computing a performance composite indicator 
for evaluating NRAs performance and the subsequent non-parametric analysis. However, 
the reported results have to be seen as indicative and need to be interpreted with some care. 
Indeed, environmental or non-discretionary factors may play a role in determining 





Table A1 – European Regulatory Framework for the Telecommunications Sector 
Directives  Regulatory Governance 
Framework Directive 
 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and 
services; (OJ L108/33, 24.4.2002) 
It regulates the principles that concern all the activities enclosed in the other specific directives, which constitute the new regulatory 
framework. It focuses above all on the responsibilities and powers of the National Regulatory Authorities, since they are the basis of 
the new regulatory system. Specifically, the objectives for NRA’s action defined at EU level should be entirely reproduced in 
national laws, as should the condition that NRAs work autonomously from operators and neutrally. The complete series of powers 
attributed to NRAs, in force of the new framework, must also be attributed to them through national law. It is also crucial that the 
various responsibilities ascribed to NRAs should be clearly recognizable, so that operators and users know whom to address for any 
particular problem. Moreover, Member States must guarantee effective mechanisms for appeal and dispute resolution, and 
transposition laws should warrant the suitable completion of the implementation process, mainly the NRAs’ first market reviews On 
the other hand, National legislation should supply transparency to the sector by making certain that the requests of the framework 
regarding the public provision of significant information on the market and its regulatory settings are fulfilled 
Access Directive 
 
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities; (OJ L108/7, 24.4.2002) 
It delineates the values that should drive the NRAs in applying their powers to supervise and, where necessary, regulate relations 
between the operators, i.e. the wholesale market. Access and interconnection conditions should be mostly ruled by commercial 
negotiations, but the NRAs shall still have authority to intervene so that the policy purposes are met. Therefore, NRAs necessitate 
justifying their decisions to commit market players and the market analysis procedures stated by the new framework offer the means 
by which they are asked to act. As a result, NRAs benefit from a broad grade of discretion that must be reconciled with the actions 




Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services; 
(OJ L108/21, 24.4.2002) 
It responds to the need of reducing the regulatory burdens on market access and of ensuring a more consistent treatment of operators 
by generating an official framework, which ensures the free will to provide electronic communications networks and services, 
subject only to the limited conditions express in the Directive. In other words, individual rights of use should only be approved, or 
limited in number, where there is a real need and when this occurs the procedures and selection criteria must be transparent and 
respect the underlying principles of Community law;  the administrative fees relating to undertakings should be limited to those 
necessary to recover the actual administrative costs of the NRAs’ activities 
Universal Service Directive 
 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and 
users rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services; (OJ L108/51, 24.4.2002) 
It designs the regulatory setting to safeguard the interests of users, providing national regulatory authorities with the necessary 
powers in order to minimise market distortions. Moreover, the universal service must be provided in a cost-effective manner and 
just those services that are enclosed in the universal service obligation may be reimbursed through a contribution mechanism or 
from public funds. Obligations should only be obligatory on operators with Significant Market Power (SMP) in a significant retail 
market not effectively competitive, and where NRAs believe that obligations imposed at the wholesale level and/or carrier selection 
and pre-selection are not performed under competitive conditions. 
Competition Directive 
 
Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 
on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications networks and services; (OJ L249/21, 
17.09.2002) 
It requires Member States to eliminate special or exclusive rights relating to electronic communications networks and services 
(including those involving the use of frequencies) and to ensure that any operator is allowed to offer them, on objective, non-
discriminatory, proportionate and transparent criteria. It is worth noting that the Competition Directive concerns all networks and 
services related to the delivery of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means (e.g. fixed, wireless, cable and 
satellite networks) and to the so-called ‘dark–fibre’ networks, which enable third parties to transmit signals, using their own 
switching or routing equipment. It hence applies to transmission networks and services used for broadcasting of radio and television 
programmes, excluding services providing or exercising control over their content.  
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Table A2.1 – Regulatory setting by Country 
 
Country Regulatory  Framework 
 
Regulatory Governance 
Competencies    Industry regulator  Policy Maker 
Division of regulatory responsibilities for 
licensing 
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Table A2.2 – Regulatory setting by Country 
 
Country Regulatory  Framework 
 
Regulatory Governance 
Competencies    Industry regulator  Policy Maker 
Division of regulatory responsibilities for 
licensing 
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Table A2.3 – Regulatory setting by Country 
 
Country Regulatory  Framework 
 
Regulatory Governance 
Competencies    Industry regulator  Policy Maker 
Division of regulatory responsibilities for 
licensing 





    

























and costs on 
service quality 
Sweden PTS 























Source: Elaboration on OECD (2006). 
 
Notes:  
1. M – Ministry, R – Regulator, C – Competition Authority. 
2. As a convergence regulator, RTR-GmbH acts as the (KommAustria) as well as the Telekom Control Commission (TKK).  
3. The State Radio-communications Agency has not been created yet, but its creation has been announced in the legislation (the same as follows).  
4. The State Secretariat for Telecommunications and the Information Society, which is within the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, 
5. Office of Telecommunications (Ottel); Radiocommunications Agency (RA); Independent Television Commission (ITC); Radio Authority (Rau) and 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) were incorporated into Ofcom in 2003, which has responsibilities across television, radio. 
Telecommunications and wireless communications services.  Table A3 – National Regulatory Authorities: main issues 
 




Appointment of the 
Head of the 
Regulatory Authority 
Jurisdiction 
(Ability to overrrule the 
regulator' s decision) 
Austria RTRGmbH 







The Minister  None 
Belgium BIPT 








Czech Telecommunications Office 
Annual report to 
the Government 
and Parliament 
Appropriation  The Government upon 
proposal of the Minister 
None 
Denmark NTA 
National IT and Telecom Agency: as a 
part of Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation  
Ministry Appropriation The  Minister  Telecommunications 
Complaint Board 
France ARCEP 
Autorité de Régulation des 
Communications Électroniques et des 
Postes  
Annual report to 
the Government 
and Parliament 
Appropriation  The President of the 
National Assembly and 




Regulatory Authority for 







The President  None 
Greece EETT 









Fees  The Prime Minister  The Minister 
Ireland ComReg 
Commission for Communications 
Regulation  
Ministry Fees  and 
contributions 
from operators 
The Minister  The Appeals Panel 
Italy AGCOM 
Autorita Garante nelle 
Communicazioni 
Legislature Fees  and 
appropriation 
The President  None 
Netherlands OPTA 
Independent Post and 
Telecommunications Authority and 









OPTA: The Crown;  
Radio-communications 
Agency: the Minister 
None 
Poland URTiP 














Fees  The Council of 
Ministers following a 














based on their 
turnover and fees
The Government with 




National Post and Telecom agency 
Ministry Contributions 
from operators 
based on their 
turnover and fees
The Government  None 
UK OFCOM 
Office of telecommunications 
Legislature Fees  and 
contributions 
from operators 
The secretariat of 
State 
None 
Source: Elaboration on OECD (2006). References 
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Annex - Data and Sources 
 
Table 1.1 - Original data set for the CRPIsc (2005) 
  Effectiveness of the national regulatory system  Effectiveness of the dispute settlement body 
  1/  2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/  7/ 8/  9/  10/  11/ 
Austria 25.0  26.3  15.0  7.5  8.0  17.5  17.5  7.5  10.0 10.0 15.0 
Belgium  20.0 11.0 2.5 10.0 6.0 5.0  20.0  12.5 7.5  10.0  25.0 
Czech Republic  27.5  36.0  2.5  10.0  4.0 5.0  25.0  5.0 10.0  5.0  20.0 
Denmark  25.0 36.0 7.5 15.0 7.0  7.5 27.5 12.5  10.0 15.0 25.0 
France  22.5 22.3 7.5 12.5 8.0 21.5  25.0 12.5  10.0 10.0 25.0 
Germany  12.5 17.3  7.5 2.5 6.0  11.5 2.5  14.0  10.0 10.0 10.0 
Greece  27.5 14.8 0.0 10.0 8.0 11.5  10.0  2.5  10.0 15.0 15.0 
Hungary  30.0 29.8 5.0 10.0 4.0 22.5  25.0  14.0  7.5  5.0 15.0 
Ireland  35.0 32.5 7.5 10.0 8.0 12.5  12.5  10.0 10.0    10.0 
Italy  32.5 28.5 7.5 12.5 7.0  5.0 20.0  2.5  10.0 10.0 15.0 
Netherlands 27.5  27.3  7.5  10.0  6.0  5.0 12.5  7.5  10.0 15.0 15.0 
Poland  35.0 31.0 2.5 10.0 4.0  5.0 30.0    10.0 10.0 15.0 
Portugal  25.0 19.8 7.5 15.0 8.0  20.0  22.5 10.0  10.0 15.0 20.0 
Spain  22.5 32.3 7.5 12.5 6.0  5.0 15.0 10.0  10.0 12.5 10.0 
Sweden  32.5 26.5 5.0 12.5 8.0 17.5  22.5 5.0  10.0 5.0 12.5 
UK  30.0 34.0 2.5 15.0 8.0 25.0 32.5  10.0  10.0    30.0 
Mean  26.9 26.6 5.9 10.9 6.6 12.3 20.0  9.0  9.7  10.5  17.3 
Minimum  12.5 11.0  0.0 2.5 4.0 5.0  2.5 2.5  7.5 5.0  10.0 
Maximum  35.0  36.0 15.0 15.0  8.0  25.0  32.5 14.0  10.0 15.0 30.0 
 
1/ Transparency. 
2/ Independence of regulator. 
3/ Speed of process. 
4/ Powers and sanctions. 
5/ Scale of resources. 
6/ Compliance with market analysis requirements and imposition of remedies. 
7/ Effectiveness of appeal process. 
8/ Speed of dispute process. 
9/ Due process. 
10/ Effectiveness of sanctions. 
11/ Effectiveness of appeal process. 
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Table 1.2 - Original data set for the CRPIsc (2005) 
  General market access conditions  Access to products 
  1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/  6/ 7/  8/ 9/  10/ 
Austria 15.0  15.0  12.5  5.0  10.0 17.5  20.0  18.0  22.0 40.0 
Belgium 10.0  7.5  7.5    7.5 22.5 15.0  7.0  19.5 45.0 
Czech Republic  2.5  5.0  7.5  7.5 10.0  3.8 22.5    12.5  12.5 
Denmark 17.5  14.0  10.0    15.0 17.5  25.0  17.0  37.0 40.0 
France 9.0  16.5  10.0  2.5  7.5 10.0 16.3  21.0 16.0 45.0 
Germany 5.0  7.5  7.5    15.0 25.0  5.0    19.5 12.5 
Greece  5.0 7.5 2.5 5.0 5.0 15.0 12.5  7.0  12.0 45.0 
Hungary  5.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0  7.0  11.5 52.5 
Ireland  14.0 8.8  12.5 17.5 15.0 12.5  12.5  12.0  30.5 25.0 
Italy 12.5  17.5  5.0  7.5   20.0  15.0  10.0  20.5  17.5 
Netherlands 12.5  13.8  12.5    15.0  15.0 5.0  9.0 25.0  32.5 
Poland 7.5  12.5  2.5  2.5  10.0 5.0  12.5    12.5 30.0 
Portugal 11.5  15.0    5.0  2.5 17.5 12.5  17.0 16.0 42.5 
Spain 6.3  14.0  5.0  5.0  5.0 20.0 17.5  10.0 10.5 27.5 
Sweden 10.0  12.5  7.5  5.0  10.0 20.0  22.5  3.0  27.0 15.0 
UK  17.5 19.0 12.5 20.0 15.0  22.5 22.5  22.0 34.5 27.5 
Mean  10.0 12.1  8.2  7.3  10.0 15.9 15.7  12.3 20.4 31.9 
Minimum  2.5 5.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.8  5.0  3.0 10.5  12.5 
Maximum 17.5  19.0  12.5  20.0  15.0 25.0  25.0  22.0  37.0 52.5 
 
1/ Access obligations. 
2/ Non discrimination and price squeeze. 
3/ Price control. 
4/ Accounting separation. 




9/ Narrow Band Voice 
10/ Broadband. 
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Table 2 - Original data set for the CRPIeuri (2004) 






 EURI-I  EURI-Q 
Austria 5.00  3.00 
Belgium 4.50  3.00 
Denmark 5.75  5.00 
France 6.50  2.33 
Germany 8.00  2.67 
Greece 7.50  3.00 
Ireland 8.50  4.00 
Italy 10.25  0.67 
Netherlands 7.75  4.00 
Portugal 9.50  4.00 
Spain 6.75  1.67 
Sweden 8.75  4.00 
UK 5.75  4.67 
Mean 7.27  3.23 
Minimum 4.50  0.67 
Maximum 10.25  5.00 
 
Source: London Business School Regulation Initiative Research Group. 
 
 
 